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 
Abstract—One of the critical threat to internet security is 
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS). This paper by the 
introduction of automated online attack classification and attack 
packet discarding helps to resolve the network security issue by 
certain level. The incoming packets are assigned scores based on 
the priority associated with the attributes and on comparison 
with probability distribution of arriving packets on per packet 
basis. 
 
Keywords— Denial-of-Service, Network security, Packet 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
HE major concern of  network security being Distributed 
Denial-of-Service (DDoS), serves to be the root for 
development in modern day security over networks. The same 
being the reason for, Packet Based Network Security and 
Traffic Optimization. 
Considering attack traffic filtering, the most vital part of 
network problems research area the attacks can be classified as 
Source-initiated: Source sites are responsible for 
guaranteeing that outgoing packets are attack-free. 
Examples include network ingress filters [8]. 
Disabling ICMP or removing unused services to 
prevent the computers from becoming attack agents, 
or filtering unusual traffic from the source [24]. How-  
ever,  the  viability   of  these   approaches hinges   
on voluntary cooperation among a majority of  
ingress network administrators Internet-wide, 
making these approaches rather impractical  given  
the  scale  and uncontrollability of the Internet. 
Path-based:   In   this   approach, o n l y    the   packets 
following the c o r r e c t  p a t h s  are a l l o w e d  [15]. 
Any packet  with a wrong source  IP for a particular 
router port  is considered a  spoofed  packet  and  
dropped, which   eliminates up  to  88  percent of  
the  spoofed packets   [4],  [28].  In ano ther  
approach [11], if the number of traveled hops is 
wrong for a source IP, the packet   is d r o p p e d ,   
thereby   eliminating   up   to 90 percent of the 
spoofed packets.  These approaches are considered 
practical, but they have a somewhat high 
p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  f a l s e    negatives, i . e ., 
f a l s e l y  accepting attack packets . Apparently, 
 
.. 
when packets use   unspoofed   addresses, which   
are a n    emerging trend, none of these approaches 
works. 
Victim-initiated: The v i c t i m    can i n i t i a t e  counter- 
measures to reduce incoming traffic. For example, 
in the pushback scheme [10], the victim starts 
reducing excessive incoming traffic and requests the 
upstream routers to perform rate reduction as well. 
There  are other methods based  on  an  overlay   
network [14], packet  marking [18], [31], TCP flow 
filtering  [17], [33] and  statistical  processing [19],  
[20],  etc.  Although victim-initiated protections are 
more desirable, some methods require changes in 
Internet protocols or are too expensive to 
implement. 
The Packet Score s c h e m e  has  been proposed recently 
by the authors of this paper [3], [19]. One of the key 
concepts in Packet Score   is   the   notion   of “ Conditional   
Legitimate Probability”   (CLP)   based   on   Bayesian   
theorem.  CLP indicates  the  likelihood  of  a  packet  
being   legitimate  by comparing  its  attribute  values   
with  the   values   in   the baseline   profile.   Packets   are   
selectively   discarded b y  comparing the CLP of each 
packet wi th  a dynamic thresh- old. This paper explains the 
concept of calculating the packet score based in the attribute 
values and arriving packet probability distribution.  
In t h i s    paper,   we   extend   the   basic concept   to a  
p r a c t i c a l  real-time packet filtering scheme using   
elaborate processes. In  this  paper, we  describe the 
Packet Score  operations for single-point  protection, but  
the fundamental  concept   can   be   extended  to  a  
distributed implementation for core-routers. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, 
we d e s c r i b e  the c o n c e p t  of Conditional Legitimate 
Probability ( CLP) and Arriving Packet Probability distribution.  
In Section 3 , we f o c u s  o n  t h e  determining normal traffic 
characteristics. In Section 4, score assignment to packets, 
s e l e c t i ve  discarding, and overload control are described. 
In Section 5, an integrated process combining Sections 2, 3, 
and 4  is described. The paper concludes in Section 6 with 
the direction of future investigation 
II. CALCULATING CONDITIONAL LEGITIMATE PROBABILITY AND 
THE ARRIVING PACKET PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION 
The most crucial  part of identifying a DDoS attach 
is by classifying the attacking packets and the ones 
that are legitimate  as per the source paper .  The 
concept of Conditional Legitimate Probability (CLP) 
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h e l p s  i n  identifying attack packets probabilistically. CLP is 
produced by comparing traffic characteristics during 
t h e    attack   with previously measured, legi t imate  
traffic characteristics. The viability of this approach is 
based on the premise that there are some traffic 
characteristics that are inherently stable during normal 
network operations of a target network. 
The concept of calculating the Probability distribution of 
Arriving Packet helps to estimate the nature of the arriving 
packet at a certain instance of time or for a given source IP. 
Comparisons leading to an observation of arriving packet 
nature for a better classification among the classes. 
We named this scheme Packet Score because CLP can be 
viewed  as  a  score   which   estimates  the  legitimacy  of  a 
suspicious packet.   We will  use  the  terms   CLP and  score 
interchangeably. By taking a score-based filtering approach, 
the prioritization of different types  of suspicious packets  is 
possible. The ability  to prioritize  becomes  even  more  
important when a full  characterization of  attack  packets   is  
not  feasible.  By dynamically  adjusting  the  cutoff  score  
according  to  the available traffic capacity  of the victim,  our 
approach allows the  victim   system  to  accept   more   
potentially  legitimate traffic.  In contrast, once  a  rule-based  
filtering scheme   is configured to discard specific  types  of 
packets,  it does  so regardless of the victim  network’s 
available capacity. 
To formalize the concept of CLP, we consider all the 
packets destined for a DDoS attack target. Each packet 
would carry a set of discrete-value attributes A; B;C; . . . . 
For example, A might be the protocol type, B might be the 
packet size, C might be the TTL values, etc. We defined 
{a1; a2; a3; . . .} as the possible values for attribute A, 
{b1; b2; b3; . . .} as the possible values for attribute B, and so 
on. During an attack, there are Nn legitimate packets and 
Na attack packets arriving in T seconds, totaling Nm. 
 
Nm = Nn + Na  
 
(m for measured; n for normal; and a for attack) 
 
Pn, the ratio or the probability of attribute values among 
the legitimate packets, is defined as follows: 
nP ( ) 1iA a   
 
The Conditional Legitimate Probability (CLP) is defined 
as the probability of a packet being legitimate given its 
attributes: 
 
p
CLP(packet p) = P(packet p is legitimate | p's attribute
                     A=a , ...).pattribute B b
 
According to Bayes’ Theorem,  
n n p n p
m m p m p
 N ( ) ( ) ...
CLP(p) =
 N ( ) ( ) ...
:
xP A a xP B b x
xP A a xP B b x
 
   
While we leave the investigation on the independence assumption 
as a future work, it seems to work in practice because the CLP (p) 
is still a good metric for packet prioritization. A large portion of 
DDoS attack packets get lower CLPs because Pm becomes larger 
than Pn for the dominant attribute values in the attack. As long as 
we can assign lower scores to the majority of attack packets, the 
assumption of independence is not essential to Packet Score 
operation. The packet arrival probability helps to discard the 
attacking packets based on the history store in the database. 
III. DETERMINING THE NORMAL TRAFFIC 
The possibilities to determine exactly the number of 
legitimate packets while on attack period is quite less. Instead 
they are determined while at normal traffic operations. 
A normal traffic profile consists of single and joint 
distributions of various packet attributes from IP headers are: 
1. Packet size. 
2. Time to Live 
3. Protocol type values and 
4. Source IP prefixes 
Those from TCP headers are: 
5. TCP flag patterns and 
6. Server port number 
The principle of Packet Score is to punish the traffic whose 
attribute value ratio is higher than in profile. Therefore, to 
accommodate an occasional surge of particular attribute values 
in legitimate traffic, the highest ratio among the periodic ratios 
is selected. This strategy has little impact on blocking attack 
traffic while giving the legitimate traffic a safety margin. 
 
Packet Score depends on the stability of the traffic profile for 
estimating Pn. It has been known that for a given subnet, there 
is a distinct traffic pattern in terms of packet attribute value 
distribution for a given time and/or given day [12], [21], [23]. 
In general, the nominal traffic profile is believed to be a 
function of time which exhibits periodic, time-of day, and day-
of-the-week variations as well as long-term trend changes. 
IV. SCORE ASSIGNMENT 
Scoring a packet is equivalent to looking up the scorebooks, 
e.g., the TTL scorebook, the packet size scorebook, the 
protocol type scorebook, etc. After looking up the multiple 
scorebooks, we add up the matching CLP entries in a log-
version scorebook. This is generally faster than multiplying the 
matching entries in a regular scorebook. The small speed 
improvement from converting a multiplication operation into 
an addition operation is particularly useful because every 
single packet must be scored in real-time. This speed 
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improvement becomes more beneficial as the number of 
scorebooks increases. On the other hand, generating a log-
version scorebook may take longer than a regular scorebook 
generation. However, the scorebook is generated only once at the 
end of each period and it is not necessary to observe every packet 
for scorebook generation; thus, some processing delay can be 
allowed 
 
1. Decoupling the Profile Update and Scoring 
According to (3), the current packet attribute distributions (Pm) 
have to be updated constantly whenever a packet arrives. To 
make wire-speed per-packet score computation possible, we 
decoupled the updating of packet attribute distribution from that 
of score computation to allow them to be conducted in parallel, 
but at different time periods.  To be more specific, a frozen set of 
recent profiles at time period T1 is used to  generate a set of 
scorebooks which is used to score the  packets arriving at the 
next time period, T2. Packets arriving at T2 also generate a new 
profile and scorebook to be used for time period T3. The time-
scale of period Ti is longer than the per-packet arrival time-scale. 
It can be configured to a fixed length or until the detection of a 
significant change in the measured traffic profile. 
This decoupling introduces a small challenge in catching up with 
attack profile change. In most cases, the traffic characteristics in 
adjacent periods are very similar, but during a rapidly changing 
attack, this assumption may be inaccurate. As a result, the 
scorebook at Ti does not represent the true scorebook at Tiþ1, and 
the Packet Score performance degrades. This can be resolved 
easily by reducing the time-scale of Ti or by using a packet 
number based period instead of a time-based one.  
More over the probability distribution of arriving packet is stored 
as a training set for future classification of arriving packet based 
on some devised constraints. 
 
2. Packet Discarding 
Once the score is computed for a packet, selective packet 
discarding, and overload control can be performed using the score 
as the differentiating metric. Since an exact prioritization would 
require offline, multiple-pass operations, e.g., sorting and packet 
buffering, we take the following alternative approach. First, we 
maintain the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the scores 
of all incoming packets in time period Ti. Second, we calculate 
the cut-off threshold score Thd as follows which is illustrated in 
Fig. 1. 
 Total current incoming traffic at period i iT = ,  
 Acceptable traffic at period i iT = ,  
 The fraction of traffic permitted to pass = 
1 / ,i i i     and 
 The Thdi+1 that satisfies CDF (Thdi+1)= i . 
Third, we discard the arriving packets in time period Ti+1 if its 
score value is below the cut-off threshold Thdi+1. At the same 
time, the packets arriving at Ti+1 create a new CDF, and a new 
Thdi+2 is calculated for Ti+2. 
 
 
 
Fig. 1 Selective packet discarding 
V. THE INTEGRATED PROCESS 
Fig.2 depicts the integrated operation and the determination 
of a dynamic discarding threshold. A load-shedding 
algorithm, such as the one described in [13], is used to 
determine the amount ( ) of suspicious traffic arriving that 
needs to be discarded in order to keep the utilization of the 
victim below a target value. Typical inputs to a load-
shedding algorithm include current utilization of the victim, 
maximum (target) utilization allowed for the victim, and the 
current aggregated arrival rate of suspicious traffic. Once 
the required packet discarding percentage ( ) is 
determined, the corresponding CLP discarding threshold, 
Thd, is determined from a recent snapshot of the CDF of the 
CLP values. The snapshot is updated periodically or upon 
significant changes in the packet score distribution. The 
adjustment of the CLP discarding threshold is done on a 
time-scale which is considerably longer than the packet 
arrival time-scale. The entire packet Score process can be 
best performed in a pipelined approach as discussed in 
Section 4.2 in which time is divided into fixed intervals, and 
each operation is performed based on the snapshot of the 
previous period. Specifically, the following three operations 
are performed in pipeline when a packet arrives:  
1. Incoming packet profiling: 
 Packets are observed to update mP . 
 At the end of the period, /n mP P  is calculated and 
scorebooks are generated. 
2. Scoring: 
 The packets are scored according to the most recent 
scorebooks. 
 . At the end of the period, CDF is generated and the 
cut-off threshold is calculated. 
3. Discarding: 
 The packets are scored according to the most    
recent scorebooks. 
  The packet is discarded if its score is below the cut-
off threshold score.  
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Fig.2.Packet score assignment and Traffic optimization 
 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
We have outlined the process the packet Score scheme used 
to defend against DDoS attacks. The key concept in packet 
Score  is the Conditional Legitimate Probability (CLP) and 
probability distribution of arriving packets produced by 
comparison of legitimate traffic and attack  traffic 
characteristics,  which   indicates the  likelihood  of  
legitimacy  of  a packet.   As  a  result,  packets   following a  
legitimate traffic profile  have higher scores, while  attack  
packets  have  lower  scores.  This  scheme   can  tackle   
never-before-seen  DDoS attack types  by providing a 
statistics-based adaptive differentiation between attack  and   
legitimate packets  to  drive selective  packet   discarding 
and  overload control  at  high- speed. Thus, packet Score  is 
capable of blocking virtually all kinds  of attacks  as  long  as  
the  attackers  do  not  precisely mimic the sites’ traffic 
characteristics. We have studied the performance and 
d e s i g n  tradeoffs of the proposed packet scoring scheme in 
the context of a stand-alone implementation.   The n e w e r    
simulation   results   in t h i s    paper   are consistent with 
o u r  previous research [19]. By exploiting the 
measurement/scorebook generation process, an attacker may 
try to mislead packet Score by changing the attack types 
and/or intensities. We can easily overcome such an attempt 
by using a  smaller m e a s u r e m e n t  period to track the attack 
traffic pattern more closely. 
We a r e  c u r r e n t l y  investigating the g e n e r a l i z e d  
implementation of packet Score f o r  core networks. Packet 
Score is suitable for the operation at the core network at 
high speed, and   we  are   working  on  an  enhanced  
scheme  for  core network operation in  a distributed 
manner.  In  particular, we plan  to investigate the  effects  
of  update and  feedback delays  in a distributed 
implementation, and  implement the scheme   in  hardware  
using   network  processors.  Second, Packet Score   is  
designed to  work  best  for  a  large  volume attack  and  it 
does  not work  well with low-volume attacks.  We  intend  
to  explore   and  improve  Packet Score   performance in the 
presence of such  attack  types,  e.g., bandwidth soaking 
attacks  described in  [31] or  low-rate attacks  [15]. Finally,  
a  thorough investigation on  the  stability  of traffic 
characteristics shall be performed as mentioned in Section 3 
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